Quantum authentication protocol by Zeng, Guihua & Guo, Guangcan
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
00
01
04
6v
1 
 1
3 
Ja
n 
20
00
Quantum authentication protocol
1Guihua Zeng, and 2Guangcan Guo
1National Key Lab. on ISDN, XiDian University, Xi’an 710071, China
2Department of physics and Nonlinear science centre,
University of Science and technology of China, Heifei, 230026, China
Abstract
In this letter, we proposed a quantum authentication protocol. The authentication process is
implemented by the symmetric cryptographic scheme with quantum effects.
PACS:03.67.Dd,03.65.Bz
Since the first finding that quantum effects may protect privacy information trans-
mitted in an open quantum channel by S.Wiesner [1], and then by C.H.Bennett and
G.Brassard [2], a remarkable surge of interest in the international scientific and industrial
community has propelled quantum cryptography into mainstream computer science and
physics [3-10]. Furthermore, quantum cryptography is becoming increasingly practical at
a fast pace [11,12]. Many quantum key distribution protocols have been proposed and
some have been verified in experimental. However, the previous quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) protocols are based on the legitimate users. In practice, the presented QKD
protocols are completely insecure under the men-in-middle attack 1.
In addition, the users’ identities need to be verified in the point-to-point communicator
and in the quantum cryptographic network [13], even if one does not need to generate
the quantum key distribution. For axample, if the communicator Alice is a member of a
network, when she want to enter the network, she first need to input the her password
or others characteristics to verify her identities. Alice can enter the network only her
password is correct. This process is called the authentication. If the implementation is
completed by the quantum effects, we call it as quantum authentication. Unfortunately,
there is no known way to initiate quantum authentication. Consider these cases, we
propose a quantum authentication protocol in this letter, which is implemented by using
EPR pair with the Bell’s theorem [14] (or the EPR correlation [15]).
In classic cryptography, there are three classes protocols: the key distribution protocol,
the key verification protocol, and the authentication protocol, the uses of these protocols
are different. These conceptions are useful in quantum cryptography, correspondingly,
1Men-in-middle attack: When the legitimate communicator Alice communicates the legitimate communicator Bob,
Eve intercepts all qubit sent by Alice, and communicates Bob with impersonating Alice. Finally, Eve obtains two keys
KAE , KEB, where KAE represents the secret key between Alice and Eve, and KAE represents the secret key between Bob
and Eve. As a result Eve can easily decrypt the ciphertext sent by Alice or Bob.
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they are quantum key distribution, quantum verification and quantum authentication. It
needs to stress that the quantum authentication scheme is different from the quantum
key verification scheme [16]. The quantum authentication scheme is always used in the
case of the non-QKD like that in classic cryptography, e.g., when a user want to enter a
network, he does not need to generate a key but need to input his correct identity or other
characteristics. However, the quantum key verification scheme is used for verification of
the obtained key in the quantum key distribution.
In this paper, We proposed a quantum authentication protocol. It executes the follow-
ing steps:
Step 1. Alice and Bob transfer the sharing key K1
2 into a sequence of measurement
basis. While Alice and Bob need to verify their identification, or need to set up a new
communication, they secretly transfer the reserved common key into a sequence of mea-
surement basis according to the appointment. For example, if Alice and Bob use the
measurement basis of polarization photon which was used in BB84 protocol, they may
let the bit ’0’ correspond to rectilinear measurement basis and ’1’ correspond to diagonal
measurement basis, or vice versa. We represent rectilinear measurement basis by the
symbol ⊘, and represent diagonal measurement basis by the symbol ⊙. After transferred,
Alice and Bob obtain a sequence of measurement basis, respectively. For example, if the
common key is K1 = 001101, the sequence of measurement basic is MK1 = ⊙⊙⊘⊘⊙⊘.
Step 2. Alice and Bob set up a quantum communication channel. When Alice wants
to secretly communicate Bob, Alice and Bob need to set up a quantum channel. The
transmitting quantum states in the quantum channel may be arbitrary. For example
the polarization photon state or the phase correction states[5]. In this protocol, we use
the phase correction states. So the channel consists of a source that emits EPR pairs
of spin-1
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particle, in a singlet state. The particles fly apart along the z axis, towards
the two legitimate users of the channel. Alice chooses a random basis for measuring one
numbering of each EPR pair of particles. The other particle of each EPR pair is measured
by Bob in the next step. Alice’s measurement results in effect determine, through the
EPR corrections, a sequence of states for Bob’s particles.
Step 3. Bob measures the strings of quantum states. Bob randomly measures the
sequence of quantum states by using two measurement basis M and MK1, where M
is the measurement basis for obtaining new authentication key and for quantum key
distribution, M is like the basis used in EPR protocol. MK1 is the measurement basis for
identity authentication in the current communication.
Step 4. Alice and Bob check the eavesdropper. For secure communication, the le-
gitimate communicators Alice and Bob need to firstly detect the eavesdroppers. Bob
2Here we assume Alice and Bob have a sharing key before the currently communication
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randomly chooses some measurement results measured by the basis M for checking the
correction of EPR pair. Then the communicators judge the eavesdropping according to
the Bell’s theorem (or EPR correlation).
Step 5. Bob encrypts his results measured by MK1. Although Bob does not know the
qubits measured by Alice, it will not influence the identity verification. Expressing the
strings of quantum states for authentication by
|Ψ >= {|ψ1 >, |ψ2 >, · · · , |ψn >}.
Where |ψi > represents a qubit received by Bob. After finished measurement, Bob obtains
|Φ >=MK1 |Ψ >,
where |Φ >= {|φ1 >, |φ2 >, · · · , |φn >} represents the measurement results under mea-
surement basis MK1, i.e., |φi >= MK1|ψi >, i = 1, 2 · · · , n. Transferring |Φ > into binary
bits strings m, and then using K1 to encrypt it, Bob obtains the ciphertext
y = EK1(m).
Bob sends Alice the ciphertext y, and tells Alice the corresponding sequence numbers of
quantum states |ψi >, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Step 6. Verifying Bob’s identity. Having received Bob’s results, Alice analyzes Bob’s
results. Alice decrypts the ciphertext,
m = E−1K1(y),
and compare her results with m, thereby Alice gets the measurement basis MKt. If
Kt = K1, Bob’s identity is true.
Step 7 Verifying Alice’ identity. After Alice decrypted the ciphertext, Alice sends Bob
the result m′. If m′ = m, Alice’s identity is true.
Step 8. Alice and Bob discard the authentication keys K1, and set up a new authen-
tication keys. After finished authentication, the authentication key K1 is no longer use.
The legitimate users obtain a new authentication key K2. The method is same as the
quantum key distribution in the EPR protocol.
In practical communication, because of the noise effects errors are evitable in quantum
channel. If the errors are produced by the Bob’s measurement, Bob tell Alice the error
qubits to overcome the noise effects. If the errors are produced in transmission, Alice and
Bob estimate the bound of errors et, and consider it in the identity verification. While the
error is more than et, the communicators refuses each other, otherwise, the communicators
are legitimate.
The proposed scheme need a pre-key K1, it means that an initial phase is necessary.
Communicators may use quantum method to acquire the authentication key, e.g., the
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Biham’s technology [13]. In the Ref.[13], Biham et al. proposed a method to distribute
the quantum key between Alice and Bob by the center. To prevent the center’s cheating
(men-in-middle attack), the center must be legitimate and believable. Communicators
can also use classic cryptographic method with quantum key distribution protocol to get
the authentication key, e.g., the famous RSA system with QKD protocol. The method
is as the following: first the legitimate communicators use the RSA system distributes
the key, then in the valid time of RSA system obtain the sharing key K1 by the QKD
protocol 3, here the ‘valid time’ is important.
The proposed quantum authentication protocol is provably secure. Because: i) Our
protocol does not have the conspiracy problem of masquerading. If a forger wants to
masquerade user Alice or Bob to communicate with others, he must find the common
key. However, it is difficult to obtain the shared common secret because of the follows
two reasons. First, the authentication key is obtained by the quantum key distribution
protocol which is provably secure, so the authentication key is secure. Second the authen-
tication key is used only one times, eavesdropper does not know any information about
the authentication key. ii) The replay-attack will also not succeed in our protocol because
the key is used only one times. iii) The quantum attacking strategy is invalid, the reason
is the same as the analysis for previous QKD protocols.
There is a weakness in our protocol. Although the obtaining of the common key in
the last quantum communication is provably secure, the common key reservation has not
circumvented possibility of attacking by eavesdroppers like in classic cryptography. In
fact, this drawback exists in all symmetric cryptographic system. Of course, we can use
the EPR effects or other quantum effect, i.e., quantum memory, to keep the common
key, but the reservation time is very short according to current technology. A long time
correlation of quantum states is need in the future.
We use EPR effects with Bell’ theorem (or EPR correlation) to implement quantum
authentication. It can also be implemented by noncommute quantum states or non-
orthogonal quantum states with Heisenberg uncertainty principle (including the mixed
states) by using a similar procedure.
This project was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China, Grant no:
69803008.
3For practical quantum cryptography, the combination of quantum cryptography and classic cryptography perhaps be
useful and pontential direction
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